Tribunal de Texas registra evidencias que vinculan a Luis Posada Carriles con atentados en La Habana
1 Junio 2010
http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/20posada-600.jpg
El Tribunal federal de El Paso (Texas) presentó un documento con evidencias de la participación de Luis Posada Carriles en la cadena de atentados con bombas en hoteles de La Habana, en 1997, que será analizado este miércoles 2 de junio en una audiencia preliminar a la que están convocados los abogados del terrorista y los representantes de la Fiscalía de EEUU.
La Fiscalía envió una delegación a Cuba a fines de enero de 2010 para obtener evidencia en relación con los cargos de perjurio contra Luis Posada Carriles, pero sus abogados se rehusaron a viajar a la Isla para participar en la investigación.
De acuerdo con el documento presentado por el gobierno de Estados Unidos ante el tribunal federal en El Paso, que lleva el caso Posada, “el propósito de la visita fue entrevistar a testigos y examinar evidencia física en relación con los explosivos y detonadores utilizados para la campaña terrorista contra varios hoteles y restaurantes en La Habana en 1997″.
A pesar de que el documento de la Fiscalía no menciona específicamente a Cuba como el país que visitó la delegación, es evidente que ese país solamente puede ser la Isla, pues toda la evidencia en relación con la bombas que estallaron en La Habana en 1997, incluyendo explosivos, detonadores, testigos presenciales y autores materiales, solo se encuentran en esa nación caribeña.
En una entrevista que le concedió al New York Times en 1998, Luis Posada Carriles alardeó ser el autor intelectual de esos atentados que resultaron en el asesinato del jóven italiano Fabio DI Celmo el 4 de septiembre de 1997, en el Hotel Copacabana. Tenía solamente 32 años.
El propósito de la campaña terrorista dirigida por Luis Posada Carriles en 1997 fue aterrorizar a los turistas para que no viajaran a la isla. Sus cómplices pusieron bombas en varios de los hoteles más lujosos de Cuba, incluyendo el Meliá Cohiba, el Capri y el Nacional. Además en el famoso restaurante La Bodeguita del Medio.
Pese a la evidencia de que Cuba le entregó al gobierno de los Estados Unidos en 1997 y otra vez en enero de este año, los Estados Unidos se ha rehusado a encausar a Posada Carriles por asesinato y terrorismo. Solo lo procesan por mentiroso.
El Presidente Obama sabe que Luis Posada Carriles es prófugo de la justicia venezolana. Tiene 73 cargos de asesinato pendientes en relación a la voladura de un avión de pasajeros el 6 de octubre de 1976. Las 73 personas a bordo fueron asesinadas, incluyendo una niñita llamada Sabrina de solamente 9 años. Posada se fugó de la cárcel en Venezuela con la ayuda de sus cómplices en Miami y en Washington.
El 15 de junio se cumplen cinco años de la presentación de la solicitud de extradición que le hicimos al Departamento de Estado. Los Estados Unidos no nos ha respondido. Posada sigue libre en Miami, y la fiscalía solamente lo acusa de mentiroso pero no de asesino. Presidente Obama, usted dijo que iba a hacer cambios. Que su presidencia sería una de “cambios en los cuales podemos creer”.
Cambie entonces la politiquería bushiana de proteger a los terroristas en Miami. Sr. Presidente, no se deje intimidar por el pasado, ni por los extremistas ¡Si se puede! Extradite a Posada.
*José Pertierra es el abogado que representa al gobierno de Venezuela para la extradición del terrorista Luis Posada Carriles. Tiene su bufete en Washington DC.”
• Descargue el documento presentado ante el Tribunal: US Response to Posada Motion to Strike
http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2010/06/01/registra-tribunal-de-texas-evidencias-que-vinculan-a-luis-posada-carriles-con-atentados-en-la-habana/
http://www.aporrea.org/internacionales/n158498.html
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
El Paso Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
) Case No. EP-07-CR-87
v. ))
The Honorable Kathleen Cardone
LUIS POSADA CARRILES )
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO STRIKE EXPLOSIVES EXPERT WITNESS REPORT
AND EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY, ALTERNATIVELY FOR
PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE FOR TESTING
The United States of America hereby submits this response to the Defendant’s Motion to
Strike Government’s Explosives Expert Witness Report, and Exclusion of Testimony,
Alternatively Motion for Production of Evidence for Testing by Defense Expert, filed on May
18, 2010 [dkt. 452] (“Deft. Mot.”), and respectfully requests that the defendant’s motion be
denied.
The defendant first asks this Court to strike the reports of two FBI explosives experts.
The documents report the analysis of blasting caps and explosive samples conducted,
respectively, in a foreign country and at the FBI’s laboratory in the United States. The Bureau
analyzed these items in 1998, close in time to the Havana bombing campaign that forms the
factual basis for some charges in this case. Noting this date, and claiming that the United States
disclosed these reports “[o]n the eve of trial, and before the Government requested an emergency
continuance,” the defendant’s spare submission simply asks this Court to exclude the reports as
“untimely.” Deft. Mot. at 2.
The defendant’s motion is grounded in the premise that this Court should strike the
challenged reports, or derivative testimony, because their disclosure was “untimely” for the
originally-scheduled March 1, 2010 trial. Leaving aside, for the moment, that the trial date has
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not yet been rescheduled, the defendant’s argument rings hollow. In fact, the expert reports were
not disclosed “[o]n the eve of trial” as the defendant contends, but rather weeks before trial was
originally scheduled to begin. Notably, the defendant failed to object during that pre-trial period.
Moreover, the defendant’s focus on the analysis dates ignores the operative facts. After a late-
January 2010 visit to a foreign nation, the United States verified the knowledge and availability
of witnesses relevant to establishing the foundation for potential testimony about the explosives
and blasting caps described in the reports. The reports and potential expert testimony thus only
became available for use in the United States’ case-in-chief, and subject to discovery, after these
foundational predicates were established. The United States disclosed the information shortly
after it became discoverable. The defendant’s observation that the reports “have been in the
Government’s possession for over 12 years,” Deft. Mot. at 2, is ultimately irrelevant because
they were disclosed as soon as they were subject to discovery.
However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the disclosure of the challenged
reports weeks before the original trial date was somehow “untimely,” the defendant offers no
basis for the draconian remedy of exclusion that he seeks. In exercising its broad discretion to
remedy a failure to comply with discovery requirements, “the district court should consider
factors such as the reasons why disclosure was not made, the prejudice to the opposing party, the
feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by granting a continuance, and other relevant
circumstances.” United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Martinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that courts “have identified
several considerations a district court should make in determining which sanction is
appropriate,” including “(1) the reasons the government delayed producing the requested
materials, including whether or not the government acted in bad faith when it failed to comply
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with the discovery order; (2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
government's delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance”). “This
means that the court should impose the least severe sanction that will accomplish the desired
result—prompt and full compliance with the court’s discovery order.” United States v.
Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1982), quoted in Bentley, 875 F.2d at 1118; see also United
States v. Kubiak, 704 F.2d 1545, 1552 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding no error in refusing to strike
untimely report when “[t]he appellant simply asserts that the government’s untimely disclosure
of the lab report denied him his right to effectively challenge the report or pursue further
discovery concerning the evidence or the government witness. . . . the only step taken by the
defense to relieve itself from the predicament it now complains of, was its request that the
chemist’s testimony be stricken from the record”) (internal citation omitted). The remedy of
exclusion, sought by the defendant here, is the “most extreme sanction possible,” and may only
be justified upon the strongest of showings. Bentley, 875 F.2d at 1118.
The defendant fails to make any such showing. There has been no bad faith on the part
of the United States here. To the contrary, the reports were disclosed in an abundance of caution
as soon as they became potentially discoverable. The defendant made no objection to their
disclosure in the original pre-trial period, nor did he demonstrate why a continuance would fail
to remedy any arguably late discovery. And his submission makes no mention of any prejudice
flowing from the disclosure of this information in February of this year.
Indeed, the defendant cannot justify the remedy he seeks, because the premise of his
motion is fatally flawed. There simply is no basis to exclude as “untimely” information that has
been known to the defendant for months. In fact (and, as the Court is aware, through no fault on
the part of the United States), the trial did not occur on March 1, but has been continued for
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several months, perhaps to be rescheduled at the June 2, 2010 status conference. The “most
extreme sanction” of exclusion is only appropriate where a continuance or other lesser remedy
would fail to redress late discovery. Here, the defendant effectively received a continuance,
during which he had adequate opportunity to address the information disclosed in the reports.
That the defendant waited until May to ask this Court to strike as “untimely” information
disclosed in February emphasizes the vacuous nature of his request. The defendant simply
cannot show any prejudice flowing from the timing of disclosure here, which placed the
challenged information into his hands more than three months before trial is even scheduled. At
this juncture, the prejudice, if any, is entirely of the defendant’s own making. This Court should
therefore deny the defendant’s motion to strike as “untimely” information that he received
months ago.
The defendant also argues that the information in the challenged reports should be
excluded for a variety of reasons, including supposed foundational defects related to the chain of
custody and lack of authentication, as well as the defendant’s boilerplate—and otherwise
unsupported—claim that the evidence is irrelevant or has a prejudicial effect exceeding its
probative value. However, its relevance is manifest. Among other things, the defendant is
accused of making false statements regarding his involvement in a bombing campaign in Cuba.
Explosives recovered in the course of that campaign are, of course, relevant to establishing that
fact. The prejudicial effect of such evidence lies only in that it helps establish the defendant’s
guilt, as with any other evidence in a criminal prosecution. As for the foundational issues that
the defendant raises, the United States notes that they go to the weight a fact-finder accords the
evidence, not its admissibility, and thus these challenges are inappropriate as a basis for
exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Evidence must
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5
be authenticated to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
This is not a burdensome standard. . . . The ultimate responsibility for determining whether
evidence is what its proponent says it is rests with the jury.”) (footnotes and internal quotation
marks omitted); United States v. Smith, 481 F.3d 259, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that questions
about the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility). In any
event, we anticipate that, if the material is used, a sufficient foundation to admit this information
into evidence will be laid at trial. See, e.g., Barlow, 568 F.3d at 220 (“Testimony by a witness
with knowledge that the matter is what it is claimed to be can be enough to prove the thing’s
authenticity.”).
In the alternative, the defendant asks the Court to compel the United States to produce
the blasting caps and explosive samples described in the reports. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, however, require the United States to allow a defendant to inspect only physical
objects that are “within the government’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(1)(E); see also id. 16(a)(1)(F) (requiring same for reports of examinations or tests). The
blasting caps described in the report have never been in the United States. The explosives
provided to and subsequently tested by the United States were only small samples, and we
understand that any portions that remained after testing were disposed of as a matter of routine
and are no longer in the FBI’s possession. The remainder of the explosives from which the
samples were taken would, like the blasting caps, be in the possession of a foreign government.
On multiple occasions in connection with the January 2010 visit described above, the
United States has as a matter of comity informed the defendant of the process by which, if he
chooses to do so, he may arrange travel to the foreign country or direct investigative requests to
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1 The United States repeatedly communicated this information to the defense from June 29,
2009 to December 23, 2009. On January 21, 2010, shortly before the scheduled visit, the United
States further conveyed its disappointment that the defense had chosen not to take the necessary
measures to facilitate its investigation.
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its government.1 The defendant nevertheless chose to refuse to take the steps necessary to travel
along with the United States in the January 2010 trip and, as far as the United States is aware,
has not otherwise availed himself of the process for requesting investigative assistance. Having
so chosen, the defendant’s inability to inspect items not in the possession, custody or control of
the United States is again a problem of his own making.
As the Court is well aware, the United States cannot be compelled to produce something
not in its possession. Although unstated in the defendant’s motion, he likely will request that the
evidence be excluded if it cannot be produced. However, when evidence is unavailable for a
defense expert’s inspection, a court need not impose a per se exclusion of testimony related to
the evidence. Rather, the court must consider “the materiality of the evidence, the likelihood of
mistaken interpretation of it by government witnesses or the jury, and the reasons for its
nonavailability to the defense.” United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976);
see United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827, 837 (5th Cir. 1978). Should the FBI analysts testify,
they will be available for confrontation and cross-examination at trial. There is little likelihood
of mistaken interpretation of the evidence—the reports are related to the visual characteristics of
blasting caps and to the fact that the samples were explosives—by these witnesses or the jury.
The expert’s inability to produce the explosives or blasting caps, for reasons beyond the control
of the United States, may affect the fact-finder’s view of the credibility of the tests, but under
these circumstances, the impossibility of production should not serve as a basis for excluding
testimony related to the subject matter of the reports.
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WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that the Court enter an order
denying the defendant’s motion.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL J. MULLANEY
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/ T. J. Reardon III
/s/ Jerome J. Teresinski
/s/ Paul Ahern
T. J. REARDON III
JEROME J. TERESINSKI
PAUL AHERN
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice
National Security Division
Counterterrorism Section
10th Street & Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
Tel.: (202) 514-0849
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on May 28, 2010, I caused the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of
Court, and to have sent a copy to the following by e-mail through the CM/ECF system, to:
ARTURO V. HERNANDEZ, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
ARTURO V. HERNANDEZ, P.A.
2937 S.W. 27th Avenue, Suite 101
Miami, Florida 33133
Telephone: (305) 443-7527
Facsimile: (305) 446-6150
E-Mail: avhlaw@bellsouth.net
FELIPE D.J. MILLAN, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
1147 Montana Avenue
El Paso, Texas 79902
Telephone: (915) 566-9977
Facsimile: (915) 562-6837
E-Mail: fdjmillan@yahoo.com
RHONDA A. ANDERSON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
2655 Le Jeune Road, Suite 540
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Telephone: (305) 567-3004
Facsimile: (3035) 476-9837
E-Mail: randersonlaw@gmail.com
and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the
following non-CM/ECF participants: None.
/s/ T. J. Reardon III
/s/ Jerome J. Teresinski
/s/ Paul Ahern
T. J. REARDON III
JEROME J. TERESINSKI
PAUL AHERN
Trial Attorneys
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
El Paso Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
) Case No. EP-07-CR-87-KC
v. )
)
LUIS POSADA CARRILES )
ORDER
On this day, the Court considered the Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Government’s
Explosives Expert Witness Report, and Exclusion of Testimony, Alternatively Motion for
Production of Evidence for Testing by Defense Expert, filed on May 18, 2010. Upon due
consideration, it is the opinion of this Court that the Motion should be DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed this ___ day of ______________, 2010.
________________________________________
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN CARDONE
United States District Judge
Case 3:07-cr-00087-KC Document 457 Filed 05/28/10 Page 9 of 9
http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/us_response_to_posada_motion_to_strike.pdf
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"Sigue la dilación: Juicio de Posada Carriles será el 11 de enero del próximo año
2 JUNIO 2010
http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/posada-carriles-21.jpg
El juicio de Luis Posada Carriles, terrorista acusado de haber planeado una serie de atentados con bombas en zonas turísticas de Cuba, se ha fijado para el 11 de enero de 2011.
La jueza Kathleen Cardone del Tribunal de El Paso, Texas, afirmó que la fecha del juicio es firme y que no requiere de nuevos retrasos.
El juicio se había anunciado para el 1 de marzo, luego se aplazó y este martes tuvo lugar una audiencia preliminar para decidir la fecha definitiva.
Los fiscales alegan que Posada cometido fraude migratorio y falso testimonio sobre su entrada en los Estados Unidos en el 2005.
(Tomado de El Paso Times. Traducido por Cubadebate)"
http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2010/06/02/sigue-la-dilacion-jucio-de-posada-carriles-sera-el-11-de-enero-del-proximo-ano/
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http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Jos%C3%A9+Pertierra&aq=f
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=Jos%C3%A9+Pertierra&btnG=Google+Search&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=&fp=b223f3e3738973e3
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Posada_Carriles
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http://eligio-del-awiizotl.blogspot.com/2010/05/el-muy-buen-amigo-de-posada-en-el-fbi.html
http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2010/06/08/denuncian-en-ginebra-doble-rasero-de-eeuu-en-politica-antiterrorista/
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“(AUDIO) Chávez: Posada Carriles es una demostración contundente del gran cinismo de EE.UU.”
http://www.aporrea.org/tiburon/n159497.html
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"El resistirse a lo irresistible no siempre fortalece a quienes se creen irresistibles, sí, a aquell@s que ‘no mandan obedeciendo a sus mandantes’… Fideiius.
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